

T O P   S E C R E T



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to  
File No.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 13, 1950

INFORMATION OBTAINED REGARDING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN  
LEADING COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, FUNCTIONARY AND HIGH-  
RANKING OFFICIALS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RED CHINA

In connection with his recent travel to the Soviet Union, a leading functionary of the Communist Party, USA, had occasion to confer at length with Soviet Marshal Ivan S. Konev. In referring to the possibility of war, Marshal Konev stated most emphatically that the Soviet Union is willing to make any concession to avert war. He further stated, however, that Russia will not allow the loss of one life and that if one rocket or one bomb-laden plane should fall within the borders of the Soviet Union, even accidentally, the Soviets are geared for split-second, instantaneous retaliation.

While visiting in Red China, this same functionary of the Communist Party, USA, had conferences with several high-ranking Chinese officials including a two-hour discussion with Mao Tse-tung, chairman of the Communist Party of China. During the course of this discussion, Mao indicated agreement with the analysis made by this Party functionary of the economic and political situation in this country. Mao also agreed with his position on the Negro question in the United States.

In discussing the Berlin situation, Mao stated that there will be several weeks of tension and even "desperate provocations" on the part of the United States. He continued, however, that "when the time period has expired," the United States will have to get out of Berlin.

Concerning United States imperialism, Mao stated that it has been defeated on 11 separate occasions beginning with the situation in Formosa and including the 12-mile limit with respect to shipping lanes. According to Mao, the most recent defeat of American imperialism was the fact that the United States was compelled to support Castro in Cuba against Batista.

FBI REVIEW COMPLETED

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Mao continued that the United States is so dispersed in attempting to control world-wide areas that it is frightened because it does not know from day to day where there will be another incident. He cited as one example of the defeat of American imperialism the incident concerning the arrest of Chinese fishermen in South Viet Nam. In this regard, he said the Chinese Government gave notice to the South Viet Nam Government to release the Chinese fishermen within 48 hours. According to Mao, American officials in the Pentagon were so frightened by this situation that they sent their "top brass" to Viet Nam by plane to do everything possible to avoid a really serious incident. Mao stated that as a result, the Chinese fishermen were released within 24 hours.

With regard to Taiwan and its islands, Mao stated that they constitute an excellent strategic situation for the Chinese in that the United States is compelled to concentrate the full strength of the 7th Fleet there. As a result, the 7th Fleet is prevented from being in a position to aid the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean area.

Mao further stated that the Chinese can and will shell Taiwan and Quemoy for the next two years since they have plenty of shells and plenty of time. He further said that this operation is and will continue to be an effective means of sharpening the differences between Chiang Kai-shek and the United States. Mao stated that these differences are increasing day by day.

With regard to the recognition of Red China by the United States, Mao stated that he is not too concerned at the moment nor is he in a hurry to obtain it. He stated that in about four or five years he will be interested but not at the present time. He continued that this lack of United States recognition has its advantages in that the Chinese are in a position to verbally attack the United States with impunity since they are not bound by diplomatic limitations. He also stated that this lack of recognition by the United States imbues the Chinese people with greater hate of the United States and induces them to work harder on the home front.

Mao also stated that he is not worried about trade with the United States. He continued that in the first place whatever American products the Chinese need can be obtained through other countries. In the second place, he stated the Chinese at this time do not have the gold for trade with United States nor are they rich enough to barter with this country on a large scale.

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TOP SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

April 18, 1959

BY COURIER SERVICE

Mr. Allen W. Dulles  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Administration Building  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I thought you would be interested in the information contained in the enclosed memorandum. This information was obtained as a result of our over-all coverage of the Communist Party, USA, and pertains to recent discussions between a leading functionary of the Communist Party, USA, and high-ranking officials in the Soviet Union and Red China.

In view of the extremely sensitive nature of certain of the sources of our information, it is requested that the contents of this communication be afforded the most careful security and its use restricted to a need-to-know basis.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

Thoms

TOP SECRET

16 APR 1959

**VIA AIRMAIL**

**Honorable J. Edgar Hoover**  
**Director**  
**Federal Bureau of Investigation**  
**Department of Justice**  
**Washington 25, D. C.**

**Dear Sir:**

I want to thank you very much for sending me the Memorandum pertaining to recent discussions between a leading functionary of the Communist Party, USA, and high-ranking officials in the Soviet Union and Red China.

I am forwarding it to some of my colleagues here on a need-to-know basis and greatly appreciate your thoughtfulness in bringing it to my personal attention.

**Sincerely,**

**SIGNED**

**Allen W. Dulles**  
**Director**

O/DCI/ [ ] dd 15 April 59

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